Exhibit 55

Deposition of Paul Oyer (November 29, 2017) (excerpted)

PUBLIC COPY - REDACTED

```
1
              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  DISTRICT OF NEVADA
    CUNG LE; NATHAN QUARRY, JON
    FITCH, on behalf of
    themselves and all others
    similarly situated,
              Plaintiffs,
                                     Case No.
              vs.
                                     2:15-cv-01045-RFB-(PAL)
    ZUFFA, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate
    Fighting Championship and
    UFC,
              Defendant.
                 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
           VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF PAUL OYER
                  Washington, D.C.
                  November 29, 2017
                     8:36 a.m.
REPORTED BY:
Tina Alfaro, RPR, CRR, RMR
Job No: 52564
```

14 16 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 of microeconomic analysis? notion that the firm in a competitive market is 3 3 willing to pay that amount? A. It's a well-respected intermediate micro 4 textbook. 4 A. Exactly. 5 5 Q. Perfect. Okay. Q. Anything in particular about the textbook 6 6 I want -- a little clarification is that you feel is unreliable in any way? 7 7 A. I just haven't read -- read it in its necessary here because it seems that the way you're 8 8 entirety. So I certainly have no -- I can't vouch using marginal product of labor is the same as some 9 for every sentence in this book. 9 economists use the term the marginal revenue product 10 10 Q. Okay. But it's a standard textbook? of labor. 11 11 A. Yes. A. Uh-huh. 12 12 Q. Okay. All right. Let me introduce another Q. Is it fair to say that you are equating the 13 13 exhibit. This will be Exhibit No. 2. two in this context? 14 (Over Exhibit 2 was marked as 14 A. I'd have to see the context in which others 15 15 use it, but I would use them -- I don't happen to requested.) 16 16 use the term marginal revenue product of labor, but BY MR. DAVIS: 17 17 I would -- as far as I can think, those would be Q. Are you familiar with this document? 18 18 A. Intimately. equivalent. 19 19 Q. Okay. Let me just put a slightly finer Q. Is this the report you prepared in this 20 20 point on it. Again, this is just so that when we're 21 21 talking to each other we're talking about the same A. Based on the cover, I would say yes. I'm 22 22 going to assume the rest of it is the rest of what I thing. If we could stipulate that sometimes 23 23 economists would say that the marginal product of 24 24 labor is an output measure, and then when that is Q. If at some point you come to the conclusion 25 this is not your report, please let me know 25 multiplied by the marginal revenue of output you 15 17 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 immediately. have the marginal revenue product of labor. Does 3 A. I'm going to trust you on that one. 3 that make sense what I just said to you? 4 Q. And could you turn to page 18, please. Is 4 A. I didn't actually follow that. I'm sorry. 5 5 that your signature? Q. That's quite all right. 6 6 Sometimes the marginal product of labor is A. Yes. 7 7 Q. Okay. I just want to walk through now some used as an output measure, not a revenue measure, 8 basic definitions so that we are talking about the 8 and so then the distinction -- there is a 9 same thing when we're talking to each other today. 9 distinction, and it seems to me in reading your 10 10 With that in mind, let's begin with the definition report that you were treating the marginal product 11 11 of the marginal product of labor as you use that of labor as equal to the marginal revenue product of 12 12 labor and not an output measure? 13 13 So if you turn to page 5, paragraph 15, the A. Right. So I would think of the marginal 14 14 last line, you seem to indicate that the marginal product of labor as being all the additional 15 15 product of the worker's labor is "The amount the revenues created by the employee minus all the costs 16 firm is willing to pay the worker" -- scratch that. 16 having that employee incurs other than the 17 17 You say that the firm is willing to pay the worker compensation you pay. So that might be a 18 18 the additional value that the employee creates? distinction. I'd have to go back to my old 19 19 A. Right. definitions of marginal revenue product of labor. 20 Q. Is that a reasonable definition of marginal 20 So, for example, if bringing on a -- if I hire you 21 21 and I have to pay -- I have to also get a computer product of labor? 22 22 A. So I would say the marginal product of for you to be able to work --23 23 labor is the value -- the additional value that the Q. Right. 24 employee creates. 24 A. -- I would imagine that the marginal 25 25 Q. Great. Great. And then it's a separate revenue product of labor would not net out that

5 (Pages 14 to 17)

18 20 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 computer, whereas my definition of marginal product MR. WIDNELL: I apologize. I just wanted 3 3 of labor would be all the additional revenue and to object. I think you slightly misstated what's in 4 costs created by having you work for me. 4 the report. I just wanted to get that objection to 5 Q. I think we're speaking about the -- I think 5 your last question. 6 we're speaking about the same thing. I think the 6 MR. DAVIS: Okay. 7 7 distinction that is sometimes drawn is that the BY MR. DAVIS: 8 marginal product of labor is sometimes used in terms 8 Q. Let's confirm the definition of a 9 of output units other than revenue? 9 competitive market for labor. If we look at 10 10 A. Uh-huh. para- -- at page 5, paragraph 18, the second 11 11 Q. It could be sneakers, for example, and then sentence, you speak about monopsonistic labor 12 the term marginal revenue product is used to convert 12 markets as one in which a firm has power over --13 13 that into dollars, and I just want to be clear that, market power over its workers. Would it be fair to 14 if I understand you correctly, when you say marginal 14 say that a competitive labor market is one in which 15 15 product of labor you're talking in terms of revenue, a firm has no market power over its workers? 16 16 dollars? A. Yes. 17 A. That's right. I'm talk- -- I'm talking in 17 Q. And that a monopsonistic labor market is 18 18 terms of net costs and benefits, including the one in which a firm has monopsony power, is one in 19 revenue brought in minus the additional costs other 19 which the firm has power -- market power over its 20 than compensation related to having the employee 20 workers? 21 work there. 21 A. Yes. 22 O. Measured as dollars? 22 Q. All right. If we could turn to page 4, 23 23 A. All measured in dollars. paragraph 8. You describe labor share as the 24 Q. Okay. Good. Then we'll use marginal 24 percentage of a firm's total revenues paid out as 25 product of labor --25 workers' compensation; is that correct? 19 21 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 A. Sounds good. A. I do. 3 3 Q. Would you be comfortable using either the Q. -- in that way. 4 Even if you agree with me, which I very 4 label "labor share" or "wage share" to capture that 5 5 notion? much enjoy, just if you could wait until the end of 6 6 A. Okay. what I've said to say that so the court reporter can 7 7 keep a tidy record. Thank you. Q. Okay. So when I say or you say "labor 8 share/wage share," for the rest of the deposition, A. Fair enough. 8 9 9 that's what we mean. Okay? Q. Okay. 10 10 A. Okay. While we're here we had -- I had said in 11 11 that same sentence, according to your report, a firm O. Great. 12 is willing to pay a worker the additional value that 12 And in paragraph 12 I believe you have a 13 the employer creates in a competitive market; is 13 criticism of Dr. Singer that he uses labor share or 14 14 wage share as a benchmark for competitive markets; that correct? 15 15 A. I believe you said "employer" when you is that right? 16 meant to say "employee." 16 A. Labor share -- well, nothing in 17 17 Q. Let me say it again so we have it right. paragraph 12 specifically talks about Dr. Singer's 18 18 A. Got it. report. It's a statement about labor share. 19 Q. You say -- and I'll just read it -- "The 19 Q. Okay. Paragraph -- let's look at 20 20 paragraph 13. In paragraph 13 you are -- am I firm is willing to pay the worker the additional 21 value that the employee creates in a competitive 21 correct that you're suggesting a criticism of 22 22 market"; is that correct? Dr. Singer that he uses labor share or wage share as 23 23 A. That's right. a benchmark for competitive markets? 24 Q. Great. All right. Now let's define a 24 A. That's not what the paragraph says 25 25 competitive market for labor, if we could. specifically, but that is the -- that's -- what you

6 (Pages 18 to 21)

22 24 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 just said is consistent with my argument. labor market the firm is willing to pay the worker 3 3 Q. Okay. Consistent with your opinion? the marginal product of his or her labor, yes? 4 A. Uh-huh. 4 A. Sorry. I hate to be picky, but can you say 5 Q. Okay. And --5 that again? 6 A. Yes. 6 Q. No, please. 7 7 O. All right. A. Can you read that back to me? Either 8 8 A. By about 4:00 p m. I will have gotten that way. 9 figured out. 9 MR. DAVIS: Could you read that question 10 10 Q. Not at all. back, please. 11 11 And then paragraph 12, the last sentence (Record read as requested.) 12 vou say "Labor share is driven by overall firm 12 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, misstates the --13 13 revenues which includes many factors beyond the the report. 14 control of and related to the value of the worker." 14 BY THE WITNESS: 15 That is your view of the nature of labor share; is 15 A. So the reason I asked her to read it back 16 that correct? 16 is you put in a caveat that I'm going to quibble 17 17 A. Right. Yes. with and it's like this is not that important, but 18 18 Q. Okay. All right. let's be careful. You said in a competitive labor 19 Let's talk about level of pay. So if we 19 market the firm is willing to pay the worker up to 20 look at page 5, paragraph 17, in talking about level 20 his or her marginal product of labor. In any labor 21 of pay you say "The level of the individual's 21 market the firm is willing to pay the worker up to 22 pay" -- I'm eliminating some words for simplicity. 22 his or her marginal product of labor. So in a 23 23 "The level of the individual's pay is the relevant monopsonistic labor market they might not have to. 24 24 benchmark and is a natural proxy of the worker's No firm wants to pay anybody their marginal product 25 marginal product of labor"; do you see that? 25 of labor. I want -- I want to pay you zero, right? 23 25 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. I do. 2 Q. Okay. 3 3 A. In a competitive labor market you have --Q. And that's consistent with your opinion? 4 A. Yes. 4 you have to pay the person their product -- marginal 5 5 product of labor because somebody else will if you Q. And you also note that labor economists 6 sometimes use the natural log of a worker's 6 don't. Or at least you have to pay -- at the very 7 compensation or level of pay rather than the level 7 least you have to pay them their marginal product of 8 of pay itself; is that correct? 8 labor at the next best opportunity for that person. 9 9 A. That's correct. Q. Okay. Good. 10 10 Q. Okay. Can we use "wage level" to mean So I just want to be clear about this. So 11 level of pay or its natural log just for clarity of 11 you say firms are always willing to pay the worker 12 our conversation today? 12 the additional value that the employee creates, 13 A. Yes. 13 period. However, in some markets the firm has to 14 Q. Okay. And if there's a distinction at some 14 pay that amount, competitive markets, and in other 15 15 point between level of pay and the natural log of markets the firm may not have to pay that amount, 16 level of pay, I'll ask you to draw that distinction. 16 monopsonistic labor markets, for example. Is that 17 17 Is that okay? right? 18 A. Yes. 18 A. I agree. 19 19 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, misstates. Q. Okay. All right. 20 20 BY THE WITNESS: I think we've been over this, but just 21 to -- just to confirm, the last sentence of 21 A. I basically agree with what you said, yes. 22 paragraph 15 it says "The firm is willing to pay the 22 Q. What part do you disagree with? 23 23 A. Oh, I don't think I disagree with any of worker the additional value that the employee 24 creates with the assumption that the market is 24 it. So I agree with it. 25 25 competitive." That means that in a competitive Q. Okay. Good.

7 (Pages 22 to 25)

26 28 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 Can you explain -- you started to do this a minute ago about Stanford and Berkeley. If Stanford is paying me X dollars but I'm actually 3 3 and I just want to make sure I understand. Why is a 4 firm forced in a competitive labor market to pay the worth 2X to Stanford, like my -- and X has to be 5 workers their marginal product of labor? 5 greater than zero for this to work. 6 6 A. So in the most basic, truly competitive Q. It's good you can say this with no 7 7 labor market you can imagine labor is just a pure bitterness in your voice. 8 8 commodity. A. Stanford has been very good to me. I have 9 Q. Okay. 9 no complaints, for the record. 10 10 A. And so I can go be a professor, a teacher Okay. So if -- if I'm producing 2X and 11 Stanford is only paying me X, in the world we talked at any school and I create as much value for all of 11 12 12 those different schools. So Stanford offers me a about before Berkeley is offering me -- first 13 13 salary and, you know, anytime I want I can call up they're offering me 1.1 times X and then we're --14 Berkeley and say what will you pay for me to move 14 you know, the bidding keeps going until we get to 15 15 over there, and they'll tell -- they'll make an 2X, which is my marginal product of labor. But 16 16 offer based on their expectation of my value. And without Berkeley there's no reason that that has to 17 if the market is competitive, that means that over 17 happen. So that's what market power is all about, 18 18 time with some information gathering we can all the absence of that outside bidder. Q. Okay. And I think you said before that in 19 figure out how much marginal value I would bring. 19 20 20 So Berkeley will end up offering me, after some back drawing a distinction between what firms are willing 21 and forth, my marginal product of labor, and 21 to pay and what they have to pay and what they will 22 Stanford essentially has -- has to at that point 22 pay that all firms want to pay as little as they 23 23 choose whether to pay me my marginal product of can. However, when they don't have to -- or not 24 24 labor or let me go. As long as -- as long as my however. And so when they don't have to, when 25 marginal product of labor is as high or higher than 25 there's not competition, the absence of that 27 29 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 my salary, they're going to go ahead and offer me competition allows them to pay lower amounts than 3 that. So it's just like any other competitive 3 the marginal product of labor; and given that 4 4 market. We end up bidding up to the -- we end up option, that's what they'll do. Is that a fair 5 5 bidding up to the point where cost equals revenue -statement? 6 marginal cost equals marginal benefit. 6 A. Yeah, I think so. 7 7 Q. Okay. What effect, if any, would standard Q. Okay. I think I understand. I just want 8 to make sure I get the gist of what you just said. 8 economics predict would be the effect on the number 9 9 A. Sure. of workers hired when a firm has monopsonistic power 10 10 Q. So it sounds like in a competitive labor and uses that to pay less than the marginal product 11 11 market the competition between either present or of labor to its workers? 12 prospective employing firms forces a firm to pay up 12 A. So let's stop and think about that. So if 13 to the marginal product -- well, to pay the marginal 13 the product market is -- see, we'd have to think 14 product of labor of a worker; is that a fair 14 this through carefully, but if the product market is 15 15 competitive, then I would presume that by summary? 16 A. That's a fair summary. 16 lowering -- by being able to lower the cost of the 17 17 input you would -- you would -- on the one hand the 18 18 Now, in -- on page 5, paragraph 18 you're firm's demand would be higher so that would lead you 19 19 to think that the numbers would go up; but by the discussing a monopsonistic labor market, and in the 20 20 same token, if the wage is -- if a monopsonistic second sentence you say, in part, "In a 21 monopsonistic labor market where a firm has market 21 wage is lower than a competitive market wage, so 22 22 power over its workers the firm will pay its workers that's going to push labor demand -- I'm sorry --23 23 less than their marginal product of labor." Why is labor supply down. 24 24 So I don't know that -- off the top of my 25 25 A. Well, again, come back to my example I gave head, I can't tell you that there's a -- that

8 (Pages 26 to 29)

30 32 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 there's a simple answer to that. I know that -- I So what we want -- what you want to think 3 3 know that in certain contexts we talk about when about is a world where we have a competitive labor 4 monopsony -- when monopsony is undone, when a wage 4 market and then some firm starts to have the ability 5 is pushed up in a monopsonistic market that leads to 5 to exert monopsony power on its workers and that 6 increases in labor supply that lead to an increase 6 firm has monopsonistic power in the product 7 7 in employment despite the price of wages going up, market. 8 but I think it can go the other way too. 8 Q. Yes. 9 So I'd have to think about it, but 9 A. So it lowers -- it starts -- it lowers the 10 10 my off-the-top-of-my-head answer is that you can't wage and if nothing else changed, it -- if it didn't 11 make an assumption one way -- you cannot make a firm 11 change its quantity it would increase its profits 12 prediction one way or the other. It depends on the 12 because everything has -- nothing has changed. It's 13 13 elasticity of the supply and the demand curves for still charging the same in the product market. 14 labor. 14 Now, having said that -- now, the world 15 15 Q. Let's -- let's simplify the hypothetical isn't that simple because once we lower the cost to 16 16 slightly and see if that makes it easier to -- to the firm it actually will lower its price in the 17 give a clear prediction. Let's assume the output --17 product market too. Even if it's a monopsonistic 18 18 the supply and demand curves -- hmm. Let me think firm it's going to lower its price in the product 19 about this. 19 market because it's always setting its marginal 20 Let's assume the output in the product 20 revenue equal to its marginal cost. So its marginal 21 market is not sensitive to cost. 21 cost just went down. So it's going to lower its 22 22 A. I'm not sure what that means. I mean -price. It's going to want to sell more because its 23 23 Q. Supposing there's a monopoly in the output profit -- its unit profits went up. 24 24 market. Q. So you're saying a monopolist will set its 25 A. Uh-huh. 25 marginal costs equal to its marginal revenue? 31 33 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 Q. So the ordinary analysis of supply and A. Sure. All firms set their marginal revenue 3 demand wouldn't play out as would occur in a 3 equal to their marginal cost. I have to caveat when 4 competitive market. Would that change your answer 4 I say that. I could come up with some odd 5 5 in terms of the effect of a firm -- a monopsonistic situations where a firm doesn't set its marginal 6 firm paying workers below the marginal product of 6 revenue to its marginal cost. To a first 7 7 their labor? approximation, all firms set their marginal revenue 8 8 A. Okay. But in a monopsonistic labor -- in a equal to their marginal cost. 9 9 THE REPORTER: You have to slow down, monopsonistic product market --10 10 O. Yeah. please. A. -- so now you increase the wage which 11 11 BY MR. DAVIS: 12 increases the cost to the firm of -- if we -- sorry. 12 Q. So even when you're making a small point 13 If we go from monopsonistic to nonmonopsonistic 13 that you want your students not to write down, 14 14 please do speak slowly because our poor stenographer labor market --15 15 Q. Do you mind if I -- what if we turn that has to write everything down. 16 around. 16 All right. Let's walk through a 17 17 A. Okay. hypothetical. On page 5, paragraph 16 you use the 18 18 Q. So go from competitive to monopsonistic. example of a salesperson, right? Do you see that? 19 A. Sure. 19 20 20 Q. It should be the same theoretically, but Q. Great. I want to use that example to 21 21 just to keep it fair. clarify some basic concepts. Is it fair to say that 22 22 A. So that's going to lower the wage -in a competitive market we would expect the 23 23 Q. I'm sorry. I'm at least as guilty as you salesperson's compensation to equal the marginal 24 are, but let's try to slow down. 24 product of his or her labor? 25 25 A. Yep. Okay. Are you ready? A. Yes.

9 (Pages 30 to 33)

34 36 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 O. To simplify the example and to make it more calculate that on the whole this salesperson's 3 3 marginal product of labor is 10 percent of the concrete, please assume the salesperson sells 4 widgets -- I apologize for the lack of creativity --4 revenue it generates from these various revenue-5 5 generating events; is that fair to say? and gets paid purely on commission. Okay. Let's 6 6 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. say the commission is 10 percent of the sales price 7 7 of a widget and, again, assume the labor market is BY THE WITNESS: 8 8 competitive. So that would mean that the marginal A. That's more or less fair to say. I'm going 9 product of labor of the salesperson is 10 percent of 9 to put it slightly differently again. 10 10 the revenue generated from the sale; is that Q. Okay. 11 11 A. Because when we talk -- there's a correct? 12 12 A. I observe a firm that pays its salespeople natural -- there's a natural confusion that comes 13 10 percent as a commission -- their compensation 13 out of using sales commissions here, which is that 14 structure is the salesperson has -- their pay is 14 the marginal -- let's say the marginal widget you're 15 15 zero plus 10 percent of all revenue generated thinking, okay, the salesperson gets 10 percent, so 16 16 through their sales? that's their marginal product of labor. But when 17 17 deciding whether or not -- but when we think about O. Correct. 18 18 A. And so -- okay. So now what was your what's the marginal product of labor of the 19 question about that? 19 employee -- when thinking about what's the marginal 20 20 Q. Would that mean that the marginal product product of labor of the employee, we want to think 21 21 about the firm making a decision do I hire this of labor of the salesperson is 10 percent of the 22 revenue generated from the event, which is a sale? 22 person or don't I hire this person; and in a 23 23 A. Right. So it's a little more -- that's -competitive labor market, they're going to hire this 24 24 it's much more -- I know you wanted to keep it person and the amount they pay them over some period 25 hypothetical and simple, but, of course, the world 25 of time is going to approximate the net benefits of 35 37 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 bringing that person to work there. is much more complicated than that. So the 3 marginal -- I'm going to let her catch up. So the 3 Q. And in this particular case, though -- I 4 marginal product of labor of that salesperson in 4 think I understand what you just said, but I'm not 5 5 equilibrium over some period of time is such that sure it speaks directly to the issue I'm trying to 6 6 they're paid their marginal product of labor. That clarify. 7 7 doesn't mean that on every single unit that their So the firm wants to pay the net benefits 8 individual marginal product of labor was exactly 8 to the firm and that is the marginal product of 9 9 labor, and the firm's best estimate of that amount 10 percent. 10 10 Q. To use your language from before, is it in this instance is, on average, 10 percent of the 11 11 fair to say to a first approximation that the revenues generated by these event -- sorry --12 marginal product of the salesperson is 10 percent of 12 revenue-generating events; is that fair to say? 13 13 the revenue generated from the sale? MR. WIDNELL: Objection to form. 14 A. I would put it slightly differently. 14 BY THE WITNESS: 15 15 Q. Please. A. I'm sorry, but I'm going to restate 16 A. If we're in a competitive labor market and 16 slightly again. 17 17 the person is being paid 10 percent of their -- a Q. Okay. 18 18 commission of 10 percent, then I would say that on A. First of all, you said the firm will --19 19 wants to pay. The firm does not want to pay the average over a period of time the person's marginal 20 product of labor is 10 percent of the revenue they 20 marginal product of labor. They're willing to pay 21 21 generate. the marginal product of labor. They would prefer to 22 22 Q. Okay. And to be clear on the slippage, the pay zero. 23 23 reason you say on average is in the real world a Q. Of course. 24 firm may not be able to calculate exactly the 24 A. The other -- the other slight way I would 25 25 marginal product of labor on each sale, but it can think about it is we mix up -- this commission is --


10 (Pages 34 to 37)

78 80 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 Q. And why -- why -- why is that? think that's in part because the two are related in 3 3 A. Have you heard of the -- would you important ways. I just want to make sure I'm clear 4 understand the term if I use the term "teaching to 4 on what that relationship is. 5 5 So I asked you is it harder to estimate the the test"? 6 6 marginal product of labor for a nurse than a Q. I do, but just for purposes of clarity, if 7 7 you don't mind providing a brief explanation, that salesperson, and you indicated why it would be and 8 8 would be appreciated. spoke in part I think in terms of incentives. So 9 A. So if I pay -- let me -- let me give you --9 can you just draw the connection for me. What's the 10 10 let me give you a slightly simplified -- not connection you have in mind between marginal product 11 11 of labor and incentives? terribly, but slightly simplified version of what a 12 12 teacher does. To a first approximation a teacher --MR. WIDNELL: Objection, misstates. 13 13 MR. DAVIS: You can answer. and we're talking here like elementary -- let's just 14 say elementary school. Is that okay? 14 BY THE WITNESS: 15 15 A. There's a very tight connection between Q. Absolutely. 16 16 measurability of the marginal product of labor --A. So let's take a elementary school teacher. 17 To a first approximation, an elementary school 17 Q. Okay. 18 18 A. -- and incentives. teacher does two things. They teach you -- what's 19 the right word here? They teach you reading and 19 O. Okav. And what is that --20 20 writing and other skills that are going to be A. And that's -- and that's when I can 21 directly valuable because they make you more 21 measure -- I'm going to repeat it -- I'm going to 22 22 come very close to repeating an answer from about educated in the traditional sense and they teach you 23 23 life skills. Okay. How to think creatively, how to five minutes ago. When I can measure your marginal 24 24 product of labor -interact with other people, what's good and what's 25 25 bad behavior, what's appropriate and what's not. Q. Yes. 79 81 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 I can -- at the end of -- or during or at A. -- I don't have to supervise you, I don't 3 the end of years students take standardized tests, 3 have to do all these other things. So I have --4 and I think it's generally accepted among people who 4 when there's a way to map your marginal product of 5 5 study this -- and labor economists study this quite labor, I can pay you based on that and I can design 6 6 an incentive system that pays you based on that. So rigorously -- it's generally accepted that those 7 7 standardized tests can do a pretty good job of the marginal product of labor itself has nothing to 8 assessing the degree to which you've learned those 8 do with incentives whatsoever. The ability to 9 9 first set of skills, what we'll call the measure the marginal product of labor just leads by 10 10 its very nature to using an incentive system. productive -- reading and writing. Let's just call 11 11 it reading and writing. Those standardized tests do Q. I see. Good. So you were explaining the 12 not do a very good job of measuring the degree to 12 incentives that should or should not be given to 13 13 which you have attained life skills. school teachers in part because incentives are 14 So big debate in the public policy 14 inappropriate or must be dealt with cautiously 15 15 literature and education literature is should we pay because of the difficulty of measuring the marginal 16 teachers based on the standardized tests because it 16 product of labor for a school teacher as compared to 17 17 does a very good job of motivating them to do part a salesperson; is that right? 18 18 of their job, but it does so at a big cost which is A. I think that's right. 19 demotivating them to do a different part of their 19 Q. Is there a way in which you would want me 20 20 to reframe that or you would want to -- or you would job. 21 21 Q. Okay. Okay. want to reframe that? 22 22 Let me just take a step back. I originally A. I'm just going to say it slightly 23 23 differently, but I think it's -framed each of these questions in terms of the 24 marginal product of labor, and I think we've slid 24 Q. Okay. 25 A. -- more or less in agreement. For into a discussion to some extent of incentives and I

21 (Pages 78 to 81)

82 84 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 salespeople we have very good measures that do a Q. Okay. 3 3 good job of approximating their marginal product of A. Okay. So they'll -- they'll do -- if I put 4 labor, and so we use -- we use incentive systems 4 on the X axis number of fights per year and I put on 5 because we -- because that's an efficient way to get 5 the Y axis dollars per fight --6 them to -- to do their job. For teachers we have 6 Q. Right. 7 7 less good measures of their marginal product of A. -- they're going to have a supply curve. 8 8 labor and we're therefore more cautious about using So they might be willing to provide one fight for --9 incentive systems. 9 I'm going to make up crazy numbers, but whatever --10 10 for \$100. They might be willing to do two fights Q. Okay. So all things equal, if you see a 11 11 for \$150 -- sorry. Let's make it more realistic. firm using incentive payments or an incentive 12 payment system, that firm likely would be one with a 12 They might be willing to do one fight for \$100, two 13 13 fights for \$250, and three fights for \$500. So we relatively good ability to measure the marginal 14 product of labor of its workers; is that fair to 14 could map out that person's supply curve. But a 15 15 different fighter might have a different supply 16 16 curve and it's based -- and those differences are A. Yes, I think that's fair to say. 17 17 going to be based on at least two things. Q. I'm about to shift topics. The next 18 section is relatively short. Should we take a break 18 Q. Okay. 19 now, or do you want to go just a little bit longer 19 A. One is their outside options and the other 20 and then take a break? What's your preference? 20 is how much they like fighting. 21 A. We're not going to keep talking about this? 21 Q. Let's just focus on the first of those two, 22 22 Q. I will keep reading and enjoying it, but I the outside options. How does -- you said earlier 23 23 think we're not going to keep talking about it for that some fighters are bigger attractions than other 24 24 fighters. How does that relate to the outside the moment. My apologies. 25 A. I'm fine with whatever. 25 options of the fighter? 83 85 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 Q. Okay. We'll do one more section. I don't A. So the supply curve to Zuffa that I just 3 3 gave you is -- one of the factors that goes into think it will take very long, although that can be 4 hard to predict. 4 that is how much someone other than Zuffa is willing 5 5 to pay for those services. Do you think it's reasonable to assume that 6 6 the supply curve for the labor of fighters is Q. And if a fighter is a bigger attraction, 7 7 perfectly horizontal from Zuffa's perspective? then presumably someone else would be willing to pay 8 A. So let's think about that for a second, the 8 more for their services? 9 9 supply curve of labor from Zuffa's perspective. I A. That's right. 10 10 Q. And so that would violate the all workers mean, the reason I'm hesitating is that we're no 11 11 longer in a world of perfect substitutes. are fungible assumption of a horizontal supply 12 Q. And what do you mean by that? Why are 12 curve; is that fair to say? 13 13 A. That's fair to say. fighters not perfect substitutes one for the other? 14 14 Q. Okay. Do you know whether Zuffa pays all A. Well, some are bigger attractions than 15 15 others. fighters the same amount? 16 Q. Okay. So some are bigger attractions than 16 A. Zuffa does not pay all fighters the same 17 17 others and what does that -- what effect does that 18 18 Q. Do you know whether a part of their have on the supply curve? 19 19 compensation takes the form of salaries? A. Well, what you end up -- what you end up --20 20 A. What's your definition here of a salary? see, supply curves are -- the traditional supply 21 curve would be for substitutable goods. So it would 21 Q. Would it be -- would you accept it as a 22 22 be for widgets, it would be for hours of janitorial reasonably standard definition to say a guaranteed 23 23 fix amount of annual compensation separate and apart service, something like that. And so an individual 24 fighter is going to have his or her own supply 24 from any incentives? 25 25 curve. A. Okay, sure.

22 (Pages 82 to 85)



23 (Pages 86 to 89)

90 92 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 discussion of salespeople is, in my mind, a wholly for these journals review submissions to the 3 different thing than any discussion of -- of MMA 3 journals? 4 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So let's stick to the salespeople for a 5 Q. Can you briefly describe the process 6 6 moment, though. through which you go for evaluating -- in evaluating 7 7 A. Okay. a submitted article? 8 8 Q. You're drawing that connection, but my A. So do you want me to talk about my role as 9 question didn't. 9 a referee, which is what you've pointed to, or as a 10 10 A. Okay. Okay. journal editor? Those are very distinct things. 11 Q. So just sticking to the salesperson, right. 11 Q. So as a referee when you receive an article 12 12 Let's take a salesperson who is paid a percentage of that you are going to assess, what is your process 13 13 revenue generated by an event, a sale, and let's for assessing whether that article might be 14 assume that salesperson is paid purely in that way, 14 appropriate for publication or inappropriate for 15 15 on commission. publication? 16 16 A. Uh-huh. A. So the first thing I do when I receive a 17 Q. Would it be appropriate to use wage share 17 request from a journal to referee a paper is I look 18 18 as a labor economist to analyze the marginal product quickly over the paper to see if it's something 19 of labor of that salesperson? 19 about which I have an appropriate expertise. 20 20 A. No. Q. Okay. 21 Q. And what I was doing is then just drawing 21 A. So often I'll get a paper to referee and 22 22 the more general point, which I think you're I'll look at it -- I should say on occasion I will 23 23 get a paper to referee and I'll look at it, and I agreeing with implicitly but I want to make 24 24 explicit. will say I don't know enough about this topic to 25 A. Okay. 25 offer an opinion about whether this paper should be 91 93 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 Q. And that means that there isn't necessarily published or not. 3 a parallel between the form that compensation takes 3 Q. Okay. 4 in the case of a salesperson, a percentage of the 4 A. So that's the first step. Conditional on 5 5 revenue from a revenue-generating event, and on the it's appropriate for me to referee the paper, I will 6 other hand the appropriate form of analysis that a 6 then read the paper. Well, first you tell the 7 labor economist would use in analyzing the marginal 7 journal I will be able to provide you with a 8 product of labor; is that correct? 8 refereed report. Some time goes by, which is always 9 9 A. Yeah, I think I would agree with that. longer than the editor wants and longer than you 10 10 MR. DAVIS: Why don't we take a break. think it's going to be, and you finally sit down, 11 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record at 11 usually on an airplane, and read through the paper 12 12 10:47. carefully and assess it on several -- and then -- so 13 13 (A short break was had.) you -- I assess it on several grounds. One is is it 14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the 14 correct, is it interesting, is it novel relative to 15 record at 11:01. This begins disk No. 3. 15 prior research on related topics. Those are the 16 BY MR. DAVIS: 16 fundamental criteria. 17 17 Q. Okay. So I'm looking at your report, which And then I write -- and then I write two 18 is Exhibit 2, I believe. You probably don't need to 18 things. I write what's called a refereed report, 19 19 look at it for this question, but I'm looking at which can be anywhere from a paragraph to six pages, 20 20 page 24 where you list yourself as a referee for in which I say here's what this paper does. These 21 21 are fundamentally critical things. Even on a various journals, primarily it seems economic 22 22 wonderful paper there's nothing good in a referee journals. And so you do serve as a referee for 23 23 numerous economic journals; is that correct? report other than up front you say this is a good 24 24 paper or something. The rest is entirely critical 25 2.5 Q. Is one of the things you do as a referee because that's how you make the paper -- that's the

24 (Pages 90 to 93)

94 96 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 job of the referee is to point out the possible Q. Somewhere between 20 and 50 hours? 3 3 A. I believe that's correct. 4 So, like I said, it can be anywhere from a 4 Q. How many hours did you spend preparing your 5 paragraph to pages and pages where you'll say things 5 report? 6 like -- anything from this paper is derivative of 6 A. The vast majority of what I just said was 7 7 such and such, this paper is so poorly written I spent preparing my report. 8 8 don't even know what they're trying to accomplish, Q. How many hours did you spend reviewing the 9 and then -- but it can be other things like this 9 evidentiary record in this case? 10 10 A. I just have no idea. paper is really good on balance. Here are some 11 11 Q. No idea? things to think about, and it can be as little as 12 typos or as big as I think the assumption made here 12 A. I mean, some large fraction of that number 13 13 is invalid. I'd like to see how the results change I just gave you. 14 if you were to change that assumption. 14 Q. Okay. When were you retained? 15 15 A. I can look that up. I don't remember. Q. Okay. 16 16 Q. Any general sense of the month? A. Sorry. That's No. 1. Do you want -- the 17 full evaluation then requires a letter to the editor 17 A. Late October maybe. 18 18 Q. Late October of -- of -of the journal because the editor of the journal has 19 to make a decision about what to do. So you write a 19 A. 2017. 20 20 letter to the editor of the journal, which is Q. -- 2017? 21 21 When you said that there's some large usually just about a paragraph, and it says dear 22 22 fraction of the 20 to 50 hours you spent reviewing editor, I've read this paper. I have -- and I --23 23 the evidentiary record, by "large fraction" did you you know, here are -- you just basically at that 24 24 mean a majority of your time? point say things that you don't necessarily want to 25 say directly to the author, and then you offer a 25 A. I don't -- off the top of my head I just 95 97 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 recommendation. 2 don't know. 3 Q. Okay. Okay. You said you read the 3 Q. Do you have any sense of the proportions 4 article -- the paper carefully. Why carefully? 4 between reviewing the evidentiary record and 5 5 A. Well, okay. So I'm going to have to drafting the report? 6 6 qualify that a little bit. In any paper where I'm A. I can't say anything reliable about that. 7 7 going to recommend that they consider -- seriously Q. Did you read drafts of any of the -- of any 8 consider publishing the paper or where it's 8 of the reports prepared by other experts that have 9 9 possible -- or where I see any possibility that I'm been retain by the UFC? 10 10 going to do that, then I have to read the paper A. Did I read drafts of other experts' 11 11 carefully. The reason I qualified it is reports? 12 occasionally you'll get a paper and after five 12 Q. Of experts retained by the UFC. 13 minutes to 45 minutes you realize this is just not a 13 A. Other experts retained by the UFC. 14 14 good paper. Q. In this case. 15 15 Q. Okay. A. In this case. Are we -- are we discussing 16 A. And you just write to the editor, and you 16 this? I thought we were --17 17 write a very short referee report explaining the MR. CRAMER: We can know whether he read 18 18 fundamental flaws of the paper, and you move on with them. 19 your life. 19 MR. WIDNELL: Yeah. So just to be clear, 20 20 I'm not sure that he -- Professor Oyer understands Q. Okay. Okay. 21 How many hours have you spent working on 21 the stipulation entirely, but you can answer 22 22 this litigation? questions --23 23 A. Off the top of my head I don't know. THE WITNESS: My mistake. 24 Q. Do you have any ballpark sense? 24 MR. WIDNELL: -- about whether you reviewed 25 2.5 a draft or reviewed an actual expert report. But A. More than 20 hours, less than 50 hours.

25 (Pages 94 to 97)

	98		100
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	:	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	you do not need to answer questions and correct		the stipulation not to specifically address the back
3	me if you disagree about actual communication		and forth that you had with with outside counsel
4	with the that went into your preparing your		in preparing.
5	report.		5 BY THE WITNESS:
6	MR. DAVIS: I guess with the we can see		A. Okay. So I think I can pretty safely
7	if we disagree, but with well, why don't we start		7 address that by just saying that the court documents
8	with that		were provided to me.
9	MR. WIDNELL: Yeah.		Q. Did you select them from a list made
10	MR. DAVIS: and then we can move on to	10	
11	what	11	
12		12	-
	MR. WIDNELL: There may just be nuances.	13	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
13 14	That's sort of a general overview.		,
	MR. DAVIS: Fair enough.	14	
15	BY THE WITNESS:	15	
16	A. I believe I skimmed a copy of Topel's	16	j j
17	report after I had drafted my own report.	17	
18	Q. You skimmed it after you drafted your own	18	1
19	report?	19	
20	A. Correct.	20	, E
21	Q. And do you know whether it was the final	2	1
22	version of the Topel report or a draft of the Topel	22	
23	report?	23	
24	A. I would imagine it was a draft, but I don't	24	
25	know for sure.	25	in the case.
	99		101
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	:	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Did you communicate with any of the other	:	MR. WIDNELL: That's a description, right?
3	experts retained about the substance of your report		MR. DAVIS: Yes.
4	or of theirs?	4	MR. WIDNELL: I think that's not covered by
5	A. No.	1	5 the stipulation.
6	Q. And you say you reviewed the Topel report	(MR. CRAMER: He was moving on.
7	only after you'd completed yours?	-	7 MR. WIDNELL: Okay. Just to be clear,
8	A. After I had drafted my own report.	8	B though.
9	Q. After you drafted your own report. Did you	9	MR. DAVIS: Right. When you say "not
10	rely on anything in that report in your report?	10	
11	A. I did not.	1:	
12	Q. You list materials on which you relied on	12	
13	pages 26 and 27 of your report. Did you review any	13	
14	other materials on which you relied in your report?	14	
15	A. No, I don't think so.	15	
16	Q. Did you speak with any Zuffa employees or	16	•
17	executives in preparing your report?	17	_
18	A. No.	18	1
19	Q. Did you speak to any MMA fighters in	19	Ž
20	preparing your report?	20	·
21	A. No.	2	1
22	Q. Are you familiar with an article before	22	
23	we change subjects, how did you obtain the materials	23	,
24	on which you relied in preparing your report?	24	*
25	MR. WIDNELL: I'm going to instruct you per	25	
	MR. WIDNELL. Thi going to instruct you per	4:	MR. DAVIS: I guess what I'd say, since

26 (Pages 98 to 101)

	102		104
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	we're moving on	2	that.
3	MR. WIDNELL: Well, the nature of the	3	Q. If you need a few if you need a bit of
4	questions you asked, I just want to make sure we're	4	time just to make sure that it's recall, all I'm
5	all on the same page, that you're not going to be	5	asking you is whether he's using wage shares.
6	using what's in any of his responses to suggest	6	(Witness reviewing document.)
7	that that he either did or did not fully consider	7	BY THE WITNESS:
8	something based off of the questions you asked about	8	A. Okay. I would yep.
9	what we provided him.	9	Q. Does he appear to be using wage shares in
10	MR. DAVIS: Well, I guess I think this	10	his analysis?
11	is a conversation best	11	A. I believe that's what he's doing.
12	MR. WIDNELL: We can go off the record if	12	Q. Okay. And without reviewing the paper any
13	you want.	13	further, are you aware that Professor Scully
14	MR. DAVIS: Let's go off record.	14	analyzed compensation as a share of revenue for
15	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record at	15	Major League Baseball, the National Basketball
16	11:15.	16	Association, the National Football League, and the
17	(Whereupon a discussion was had	17	National Hockey League to assess monopsony power?
18	off the record.)	18	A. I was not aware of that.
19	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going back on the record	19	Q. Okay. Where in your report, if at all, do
20	at 11:16.	20	you discuss Dr. Scully's article?
21	BY MR. DAVIS:	21	A. I do not discuss Dr. Scully's article.
22	Q. Are you familiar with the article by Gerald	22	MR. DAVIS: Let's mark the next document as
23	Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of	23	Exhibit 5.
24	Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision	24	(Oyer Exhibit 5 was marked as
25	Economics, page 77 is the first page, 2004?	25	requested.)
23	103	23	105
		,	
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		
_	A 37	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. No.	2	BY MR. DAVIS:
3	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as	2 3	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by
3 4	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe.	2 3 4	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor
3 4 5	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as	2 3 4 5	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic
3 4 5 6	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.)	2 3 4 5 6	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000?
3 4 5 6 7	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS:	2 3 4 5 6 7	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article.
3 4 5 6 7 8	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination"
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes. Q. Is it fair to say that Professor Scully is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Okay. And then further down in the last
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes. Q. Is it fair to say that Professor Scully is analyzing professional athlete compensation using	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	DY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Okay. And then further down in the last paragraph, in the middle of the paragraph, again,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes. Q. Is it fair to say that Professor Scully is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Okay. And then further down in the last paragraph, in the middle of the paragraph, again, beginning "Moreover," Professor Kahn writes
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes. Q. Is it fair to say that Professor Scully is analyzing professional athlete compensation using	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	DY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Okay. And then further down in the last paragraph, in the middle of the paragraph, again,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes. Q. Is it fair to say that Professor Scully is analyzing professional athlete compensation using what we have called wage shares?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Okay. And then further down in the last paragraph, in the middle of the paragraph, again, beginning "Moreover," Professor Kahn writes
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. DAVIS: We're going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4, I believe. (Oyer Exhibit 4 was marked as requested.) BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. If you could turn to page 78. This is, as I just indicated, an article by Gerald W. Scully, "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings," 25: Managerial and Decision Economics, 77, year 2004; and on page 78, do you see in the bottom of the left column table 1? A. Yes. Q. And do you see where it says "Player compensation as a share of revenue in profession team sports"? A. Yes. Q. Is it fair to say that Professor Scully is analyzing professional athlete compensation using what we have called wage shares? MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Are you familiar with the article by Lawrence M. Kahn, "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," 14: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000? A. I am not familiar with this article. Q. And that is the article that I just marked as Exhibit 5. Okay. Please turn to page 81. If you turn to the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the second paragraph but the first full paragraph. He says "Moreover, baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982 further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination" and cites Zimbalist 1992; do you see that? A. I do. Q. Okay. And then further down in the last paragraph, in the middle of the paragraph, again, beginning "Moreover," Professor Kahn writes "Moreover, salaries as a percent of revenues fell

27 (Pages 102 to 105)

106 108 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 200-million-dollar -- 280-million-dollar back-pay (Witness reviewing document.) 3 3 BY THE WITNESS: penalty on the owners to be paid out over the 1989 4 to 1991 period as compensation for the losses 4 A. So what's the question? 5 imposed by collusion," citing Staudohar. Is that 5 Q. The question is just whether Professor Kahn 6 how it's pronounced, do you know? 6 is analyzing professional athlete compensation using 7 7 A. I've never heard of this person. wage shares in these two paragraphs. 8 8 A. Well, let's be clear about the conclusion Q. Okay. "And salaries as a percent of 9 revenue bounced back to 43 percent by 1991," again 9 he draws here. He says "The current episode 10 10 citing Zimbalist. "The collusion episode provides a provides a further illustration of the potential 11 11 impact of monopsony on salaries." further illustration of the potential impact on 12 12 monopsony on salaries." O. That seems to be -- is that an answer to my 13 13 Am I correct that Professor Kahn is question? 14 analyzing professional athlete compensation using 14 A. Well, I just want to be clear about what 15 15 wage shares? we're -- so is that the analysis and conclusions 16 16 A. Professor Kahn is quoting a book written we're talking about? 17 for a lay audience by Andrew Zimbalist in which he 17 O. Yes. 18 18 cites facts about labor share. A. Okay. I mean, sure. He states some facts, 19 Q. When you say "quoting," he's not actually 19 and he says they're consistent with monopsony as a 20 20 quoting is he? potential illustration of that. 21 21 A. My mistake. He is paraphrasing and citing Q. And are those facts wage-share facts? 22 22 facts stated in a book for a lay audience written by A. Yes, they are. 23 23 Andrew Zimbalist. Q. Without further reviewing the paper, are 24 24 Q. And is he relying on those underlying facts you aware that Professor Kahn is analyzing the 25 in his analysis? 25 effects of anticompetitive conduct on player 107 109 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 A. I would have to read the paper to let you compensation using wage shares? 3 3 MR. WIDNELL: I'm going to object for 4 Q. Why don't you take a couple moments to read 4 completeness. I'm not sure how that -- it sounds 5 5 like you're suggesting there's a conclusion about those two paragraphs to see if, in fact, he's 6 6 relying on those facts as opposed to merely -the entire paper by telling him not to consider the 7 7 MR. WIDNELL: I'm going to instruct you entire paper. 8 read the entire paper -- or review the entire paper 8 MR. DAVIS: I'm asking if he's aware. If 9 9 to the extent that you feel there may be more he's not aware without reading the paper, he could 10 10 information that could be relevant. simply answer the question I'm not aware one way or 11 11 MR. DAVIS: I suggest you read the the other. 12 paragraphs briefly, and then if you feel like 12 BY THE WITNESS: 13 13 there's more information that needs to be -- that A. So what's the question? 14 you would need to answer that narrow question, then 14 Q. The question is, are you aware that in 15 15 we can go from there. particular Professor Kahn is analyzing the effects 16 MR. WIDNELL: I think he should be entitled 16 of anticompetitive conduct on player compensation 17 17 to see the entire document, look through the entire using wage shares? 18 document at least before he makes some sort of 18 A. Among other -- he is using wage share among 19 19 other means of -- among other methods and measures, conclusion about what --20 MR. DAVIS: I haven't disputed that yet. 20 sure. 21 Q. Okay. And are you aware that Professor MR. WIDNELL: Well, you're instructing him 21 22 22 just to review two paragraphs rather than to Kahn is analyzing wage shares for Major League 23 23 consider the paper as a whole I think. Baseball to assess monopsony power? 24 MR. DAVIS: I'm asking him to see if he 24 A. I -- now I think you've made it too strong. 25 2.5 needs to read more to answer that narrow question. I mean, it's an illustration of potential impact.

28 (Pages 106 to 109)

	110		112
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Okay. Where in your report do you discuss	2	A. Didn't I already answer that question?
3	Dr. Kahn's article?	3	Q. Not for this article.
4	A. I don't discuss Dr. Kahn's article.	4	A. You asked me if I was aware of this article
5	Q. The next document should be is	5	before.
6	Exhibit 6. Are you familiar with the article by	6	Q. That probably is a logical corollary
7	John Vrooman, "Theory of the Perfect Game:	7	that
8	Competitive Balance excuse me Competitive	8	A. I was not aware of this article until you
9	Balance in Monopoly Sports Leagues," 34: Review of	9	showed it to me.
10	Industrial Organization beginning on page 52009?	10	Q. Okay. So of course, you were not aware
11	A. Not that I know of.	11	that Professor Vrooman analyzes wage share for the
12	MR. DAVIS: Could you please mark this as	12	four major sports to assess monopsony power; is that
13	Exhibit 6.	13	correct?
14	(Oyer Exhibit 6 was marked as	14	MR. WIDNELL: So you're not asking him
15	requested.)	15	whether or not he believes that's what he does.
16	BY MR. DAVIS:	16	You're stating that's your belief about what he
17	Q. The very first page is page 5 and that has	17	does, and you're asking if he's aware of that of
18	the abstract. In the middle of the abstract he says	18	whether or not that's the case; is that right?
19	"Evidence of the sportsman effect is provided by	19	MR. DAVIS: Yes.
20	erosion of monopsonistic exploitation in the four	20	MR. WIDNELL: Okay. Got it.
21	major American sports leagues where players now	21	BY THE WITNESS:
22	share about 60 percent of revenue." Am I correct	22	A. I was not aware of this article until you
23	that Professor Vrooman in that sentence is analyzing	23	showed it to me. I'm going to leave it at that.
24	professional athlete compensation using wage shares?	24	Q. So you're not aware one way or another of
25	A. I don't know what what is the sportsman	25	any use that Professor Vrooman puts wage share to,
23	111	23	113
		1	
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	effect?	2	including assessing monopsony power?
3	Q. It's actually explained two sentences just	3	A. That's right.
4	above in the abstract.	4	Q. Okay. Where in your report did you discuss
5	(Witness reviewing document.)	5	Dr. Vrooman's article?
6	BY THE WITNESS:	6	A. I do not discuss Dr. Vrooman's article.
7	A. Okay. So I'm sorry. The question again?	7	Q. Are you familiar with an article by John
8	Q. My question is just a very narrow one.	8	Twomey and James Monks with the title "Monopsony and
9	Where he says in the third sentence he's talking	9	Salary Suppression: The Case of Major League Soccer
10	about the erosion of monopsonistic exploitation in	10	in the United States," 56: The American Economist,
11	the four major sports leagues and says where players	11	pages 20 to 28, and the year is 2011?
12	now share about 60 percent of revenues. My question	12	A. No.
13	is just that. When he speaks of 60 percent of the	13	MR. DAVIS: Let's mark this as Exhibit 7,
14	revenues in those leagues as what the players	14	which is the article I just described.
15	receive, is he using wage share as we've defined	15	(Oyer Exhibit 7 was marked as
16	it?	16	requested.)
17	A. I think so.	17	BY MR. DAVIS:
18	Q. Okay.	18	Q. If you could turn to page 20, and in the
19	Are you aware just as you sit here without	19	abstract starting with the third sentence discussing
20	reviewing the article, that Professor Vrooman	20	the monopsonistic structure of Major League Soccer,
21	analyzed compensation as a share of revenue in the	21	the authors write "This monopsonistic structure was
22	NFL, Major League Baseball, NBA, and NHL to assess	22	designed to eliminate competition for players across
23	monopsony power?	23	teams within the league and thus allow the league to
24	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	24	suppress player salaries. This paper investigates
25	BY THE WITNESS:	25	how effective the MLS has been in achieving this

29 (Pages 110 to 113)

114 116 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 goal and finds that the MLS devotes only about 25 Looking at that, am I correct that 3 3 percent of its revenues to player salaries compared Professor Monks is using wage share to analyze 4 to 50 to 60 percent in most other U.S. professional 4 college athlete compensation? 5 5 sports and professional soccer leagues abroad." A. I would guess so based on this. 6 6 My question is am I correct that Professors Q. Based on that. Okay. And are you aware 7 7 Twomey and Monks are using wage share to analyze that Professor Monks analyzes wage share for college 8 8 athlete compensation? athletes to assess monopsony power? 9 A. It would appear so. 9 A. Well, you've just made me aware of it. 10 10 Q. Okay. And are you aware that Professors Q. Okay. So you're now aware of it? 11 Twomey and Monks analyzed wage share for MLS to 11 A. That's right. 12 assess monopsony power? 12 O. Where in your report do you discuss this 13 13 A. Until you showed me this article, I had paper by Monks? 14 never heard of John Twomey, James Monks, or The 14 A. This unpublished working paper that I've 15 15 American Economist. never heard of and that leaps to a grand conclusion 16 16 Q. Is it fair to say that you are -- that in the last line of the abstract that seems 17 17 completely unwarranted, I don't refer to it. means you're unaware that they analyze wage share 18 18 for MLS to assess monopsony power? Q. Have you read the whole paper? 19 A. That's correct. 19 A. I have not. 20 20 Q. Okay. And where in your report do you Q. So do you know whether the contents of the 21 discuss this Twomey and Monks article? 21 paper justify the --22 22 A. Yeah. I mean, I can --A. I don't. 23 23 Q. Are you familiar with a paper by James Q. -- conclusion? 24 Monk -- Monks, "Revenue Shares and Monopsonistic 24 A. The reason I say that in his abstract he 25 Behavior in Intercollegiate Athletics"? It's dated 25 says "Clearly," which leads me to think he's saying 115 117 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 on the paper itself September 2013. clearly based on what he's presented in the abstract 3 A. No. 3 that he can draw that conclusion, and I don't think 4 MR. DAVIS: Please mark this as Exhibit 8. 4 that's valid. 5 (Oyer Exhibit 8 was marked as 5 Q. Okay. But based only on the abstract? 6 6 requested.) A. Agreed. 7 7 BY MR. DAVIS: Q. Okay. 8 Q. The paper I just described is Exhibit 8. 8 Let's look back at Exhibit 1. Can you find 9 9 Please turn to the first page after the title page that? So Exhibit 1 you'll recall is the textbook on 10 10 microeconomics, Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel where there's an abstract. In the last two 11 11 sentences he writes, comparing the four major Rubinfeld, Microeconomics. The particular version 12 sports -- baseball, basketball, football and 12 is 9th edition, 200- -- it's labeled 2018, but that 13 13 hockey -- to NCAA athletics, that whereas the major seems premature. 14 sports have negotiated aggregate salaries that 14 If you look at pages 540 and 541, there's 15 15 represent over 50 percent of league-wide revenues, an example 14.4, and the heading, do you see where 16 he then says "In comparison analyzing data from the 16 it says "Monopsony Power in the Market for Baseball 17 17 post -- from the Office of Post-Secondary Education, Players"? 18 18 OPE, of the Department of Education on 2,068 A. Uh-huh. 19 19 institutions of higher education reveals that Q. Okay. And then if you turn to page 541, 20 20 intercollegiate athletes receive payments in kind the paragraph that spills over from the bottom of 21 21 via athletic scholarships that constitute less than this insert left column to the right column, it 22 22 22 percent of total athletic department revenues. begins "The result was an interesting experiment in 23 23 labor market economics. Between 1975 and 1980 the Clearly the monopsonistic practices of the NCAA are 24 effective in restricting the compensation of 24 market for baseball players adjusted to a new post 25 25 athletes." reserve clause equilibrium. Before 1975

30 (Pages 114 to 117)

120 118 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 expenditures on player's contracts made up page -- on paragraph 22. 3 3 approximately 25 percent of all team expenditures. A. Okay. 4 By 1980 those expenditures had increased to 40 4 Q. So is it correct that you discuss his book, 5 5 the one I identified, Monopsony In Motion, and percent." 6 In those last two sentences where the 6 suggest it does not contain analyses using wage 7 7 authors are describing compensation to players as a share? 8 8 percentage of all team expenditures, would you A. That's right. 9 characterize that as a wage-share analysis? 9 Q. Are you suggesting that Dr. Manning 10 10 explicitly rejects wage share concluding it is an A. It's interesting you chose those two 11 11 inappropriate basis for analyzing compensation in sentences instead of anything else in this box; but 12 12 yes, I would characterize those that way. labor markets? 13 13 Q. You would characterize those that way. A. I have no recollection of him doing that. 14 Okay. And where in your report do you discuss this 14 Q. Okay. And there's nowhere in your report 15 15 portion of the Pindyck and Rubinfeld book? that you're aware of where you cite him explicitly 16 16 rejecting wage share for analyzing compensation in A. I don't discuss the Pindyck and Rubinfeld 17 17 book. I think it's fair to note for the record that labor markets? 18 18 A. That's right. you've shown me a 2018 book and asked me where I 19 reference it. It would be hard for me to reference 19 Q. Okay. Are you aware that there are 20 20 a book that's not yet available. numerous other books on monopsony power including in 21 21 labor markets? Q. It is available, actually, to be clear. 22 A. We don't know that that was true when I 22 A. I -- there must --23 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 23 wrote my report. 24 24 BY THE WITNESS: Q. If that insert was in the previous edition, 25 25 then do you think it would have been possible for A. Am I aware that there are other books on 121 119 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 2 you to have reviewed it in drafting your report? monopsony in labor markets? 3 A. Then I can't -- anyway, no, because I 3 Q. Yes. 4 didn't review that book, to be honest. 4 A. There are books on everything. 5 5 O. Fair enough. Q. Okay. 6 Turning back to Exhibit 2, this is your 6 A. So I -- I can't say that I'm aware of other 7 report. Do you have that before you? 7 books on monopsony in labor markets. I can tell you 8 A. I do. 8 that I certainly would expect there are many other 9 9 Q. Okay. In your report you discuss a books on monopsony in labor markets. 10 10 particular book on monopsony power in the labor Q. Okay. Well, is there some reason you focus 11 11 markets, Alan Manning, Monopsony In Motion -on Dr. Manning's books -- book as opposed to the 12 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. 12 13 MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry. Yes. Should I 13 A. Yes. It's a well-known, well-cited, highly 14 start from the beginning of that sentence? 14 regarded book among labor economists. 15 THE REPORTER: No. After labor markets. 15 Q. Is it possible that there are other books 16 BY MR. DAVIS: 16 on monopsony power in labor markets that are 17 17 Q. Alan Manning, M-A-N-N-I-N-G, Alan is similarly well known and similarly broadly cited? 18 18 A-L-A-N, Monopsony In Motion, and suggests it does A. Is it possible? I guess. I mean, 19 not contain analysis -- analyses using wage share; 19 anything's possible, right? I have not done a 20 is that correct? 20 thorough search of all books on monopsony in the 21 21 A. Where are you pointing me to? labor market. 22 22 Q. Pages --Q. As a labor economist would you likely be 23 23 A. It's consistent -familiar with this particular literature? 24 Q. -- 6 and 7 of your report. I think you 24 A. Sure. I mean, yes and no. I'm familiar 25 begin the discussion of Professor Manning's work on with this literature. Books are a different story.

31 (Pages 118 to 121)

	122		124
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2		1 2	
	This was written for the main goal of this book	3	effects of monopsony power? A. I don't think I cite to that.
3 4	is not really to sell to other academic economists. It's to sell to students and lay people interested	4	
5			Q. Where in your report do you cite to any
6	in the topic.	5	publication that says it is inappropriate for a
7	Q. Well, so then would economists find Professor Manning's book and his opinions	7	labor economist to use wage share in determining the
8	authoritative?	8	marginal product of labor of a worker?
9	A. Sure.	9	A. I don't. There would be no reason to say
10		10	that.
11	Q. Oh, they would? A. Yeah.	11	Q. Okay. Where in your report do you cite to any publications that use wage level as a measure of
12		12	
13	Q. Do you think this is a particularly authoritative source on labor markets and monopsony	13	the marginal product of labor of professional athletes?
14	power?	14	A. That use wage level as a measure of so
15	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	15	can you I'm sorry. I need that one again.
	BY THE WITNESS:	16	·
16 17	A. Alan Manning is a recognized expert and	17	Q. Sure. Where in your report do you cite to any publications that use wage level as a measure of
		18	• •
18 19	leader in the thinking of monopsony analysis of monopsony in labor markets. So his book and his	19	the marginal product of labor of professional athletes?
	handbook chapter are authoritative sources among	20	A. I have to think about that one. I don't
20 21	labor economists.	21	think I do.
22		22	
23	Q. So it's more that you would say Professor	23	Q. Where in your report do you cite to any
24	Manning is particularly authoritative, or I guess you could say both, he and his book?	24	publications that measure the marginal product of labor of professional athletes at all?
25	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	25	A. I don't that I can recall.
23	123		125
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	BY THE WITNESS:	2	Q. Where in your report do you cite to any
3	A. So is there a question?	3	publications that assess the effects of monopsony
4	Q. Yeah. Are you saying that both Professor	4	power on the compensation of professional athletes?
5	Manning and his book are particularly authoritative?	5	A. Sorry. Can you read that back?
6	A. Yes.	6	Q. Where in your report do you cite to any
7	Q. Where in your report do you cite to any	7	publications that assess the effects of monopsony
8	publications that say it is inappropriate for a	8	power on the compensation of professional athletes?
9	labor economist to use wage share in conducting	9	A. And we're not counting the other expert
10	microeconomic analysis?	10	reports as relevant publications on which I comment?
11	A. I don't remember citing to that.	11	Q. You didn't cite to them or rely on them,
12	Q. Where in your report do you cite to any	12	you said.
13	publications that say it is inappropriate for a	13	A. The Singer report and the
14	labor economist to use wage share in assessing the	14	Q. Oh, the Singer oh, I misunderstood.
15	effects of monopsony power?	15	A and the Zimbalist report?
16	A. Is that different from the last question?	16	Q. Oh, so the Singer report and the Zimbalist
17	Q. The last question was about conducting	17	report.
18	microeconomic analysis, and this second question was	18	A. We're not counting those as whatever
19	more specifically addressing assessing the effects	19	however whatever you termed it. Studies?
20	of monopsony power. Should I read it back to you	20	Q. I had said publications.
21 22	just to be clear?	21	A. Okay. But other than those, no.
	A. That would be great.	22	Q. We were talking over each over and, again,
23	Q. Where in your report do you cite to any	23	I'm as much at fault at least as you.
24	publications that say it is inappropriate for a labor economist to use wage share in assessing the	24 25	A. Sorry. Q. Just to clarify, you did not cite to any
25			

32 (Pages 122 to 125)

	126		128
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	publications that assess the effects of monopsony	2	guess that he would share that view.
3	power on the compensation of professional athletes	3	MR. DAVIS: I am at a good breaking point.
4	with the possible exception of the Singer and	4	On the other hand, I could go forward. What do
5	Zimbalist reports that you reviewed in this case?	5	folks prefer?
6	A. That's correct.	6	MR. WIDNELL: Is lunch here?
7		7	MR. NAKAMURA: Lunch is here.
	Q. What publications have you written that	8	
8	measure the marginal product of labor of	-	MR. DAVIS: Shall we take a break? Okay.
9	professional athletes?	9	Let's go off the record.
10	A. I have not written a publication that does	10	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record at
11	that.	11	11:51.
12	Q. What publications have you written that	12	(Whereupon, at 11:51 a m., the
13	assess the effect of monopsony power on the	13	deposition was recessed, to
14	compensation of professional athletes?	14	reconvene at 12:35 p.m., this
15	A. I have not written a paper on that.	15	same day.)
16	Q. I think I'm just reaffirming what we've	16	
17	already established, but it sets a predicate for my	17	
18	next question. So let me just confirm. Your view	18	
19	is that wage share is not an appropriate way to	19	
20	evaluate worker compensation or to benchmark	20	
21	competition in competitive labor markets; is that	21	
22	correct?	22	
23	A. That's correct.	23	
24	Q. Do you think that's a standard view for	24	
25	economists?	25	
	127		129
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. For labor economists I believe that would	2	AFTERNOON SESSION
3	be a standard view.	3	(12:41 p m.)
4	Q. Do you think other economists would share	4	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the
5	your view, other labor economists would share your	5	record at 12:41. This begins disk No. 4.
6	view?	6	PAUL OYER,
7	A. I do.	7	the witness at the time of recess, having been
8	Q. Do you think, for example, David Autor,	8	previously duly sworn, was further examined and
9	A-U-T-O-R, whom you cite, would share that view?	9	testified as follows:
10	A. I do.	10	EXAMINATION
11	Q. How about Barry Hirsh or Edward Shumacher?	11	(Resumed)
12	A. I do.	12	(Oyer Exhibit 9 was marked as
13	Q. You think they would share that view too?	13	requested.)
14	A. I do.	14	BY MR. DAVIS:
15		15	
	Q. Alan Manning, do you think he would share		Q. Okay. I'd like to introduce Exhibit No. 9,
16	that view?	16	I think is the next one. Yes. It should be Kevin
17	A. I do.	17	Murphy and Paul Oyer, "Discretion in Executive
18	Q. Edward Leamer, do you think he would share	18	Incentive Contracts, Theory and Evidence," a draft
19	that view?	19	marked June 2001. Do you recognize this document?
20	A. Edward Leamer is not a labor economist.	20	A. I have much less fond memories of this one;
21	He's a very good economist. Based on the very	21	but yes, I do.
22	redacted version of his expert report in high-tech	22	Q. Okay. What is it?
23	workers, I would guess he would share that view.	23	A. It's a paper it's a working paper
24	Q. Okay. What about Suresh Naidu?	24	version of a paper I wrote many years ago.
25	A. I would assume he would share I would	25	Q. Okay.

33 (Pages 126 to 129)

170 172 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 litigation? sports. 3 3 Q. That's a bit of a mouthful. I guess, sure, A. They're the ones that are in my report. 4 if you prefer the Zimbalist sports. It doesn't trip 4 O. Let's start with the nascent business 5 off the tongue like major sports. 5 explanation. Is it your opinion that, all else 6 6 A. Okay. We'll call them the major sports if equal, if a league is earlier in its development it 7 7 it means a lot to you. would be expected to pay a lower share of its 8 8 Q. The major sports. Thank you. All right. revenue to its fighters than it would pay as it 9 So I'm going to just give a very short 9 matures? 10 10 description of each category of reason to make sure A. Not necessarily. 11 11 that we are on the same page, and then we can talk Q. Not necessarily. So it's possible that you 12 12 more about each of those perhaps in depth. have it exactly backwards, that nascent sports 13 13 In paragraph 56 you offer what might be businesses pay a higher share of revenue so that the 14 labeled the nascent business explanation, and that 14 major sports are a conservative benchmark in this 15 15 says generally that nascent businesses often face 16 16 different cost and revenue structures than A. That's empirically not true, right. So I 17 established businesses with nascent sports leagues 17 don't think that -- I don't think I have it exactly 18 18 possibly paying lower revenue share than established backwards like as a general rule or something. I 19 sports leagues. Is that a fair summary? 19 don't think we know the general rule. I think that 20 20 A. Yes. we can't make a comparison about how things get done 21 Q. Okay. And then in paragraph 57 you offer 21 in a nascent sport versus a not nascent sport, for 22 22 what I -- what we might call the substitutability lack of a better way of saying it. 23 23 explanation, that marginal fighters may be better Q. So you have no idea one way or the other, 24 24 substitutes for top fighters compared to marginal though? 25 athletes in the major sports. Is that a fair 25 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 171 173 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 summary? BY THE WITNESS: 3 A. Yes. 3 A. I have no idea one way or the other about 4 Q. Okay. And then in paragraph 58 you offer 4 what? 5 5 the scale of revenue explanation, which broad-brush Q. You have no idea whether a nascent sport or 6 6 is that the scale of revenue may explain the a mature sport pays a higher revenue share or if, in 7 difference such that leagues with greater -- greater 7 fact, a nascent versus mature sport, that 8 revenue may pay a higher share of their revenue to 8 distinction doesn't matter at all? 9 athletes than leagues with lesser revenue. Is that 9 A. I wouldn't say I have no idea. I mean, 10 10 a fair broad-brush description? we're looking at a bunch of nascent sports that have 11 A. Yes. 11 very low shares. You've shown me a bunch of papers 12 Q. Okay. So just to summarize, we have the 12 that show that these other sports over time increase 13 13 nascent business explanation, the substituted -the share that went to the players. 14 14 substitutability explanation, and the scale of Q. Do you know whether that share increased 15 15 revenue explanation. Are you aware of any other because the sport matured or whether it increased 16 reasons why the UFC might pay a lower share of 16 because of the elimination of anticompetitive 17 17 revenue to its athletes than the major sports? 18 18 A. I mean, I guess there are other differences A. I don't -- I mean, certainly my guess would 19 19 that could affect the shares of revenue one way or be some of the latter, but I don't know about -- you 20 20 know, would I guess some of the former too? Depends the other. I haven't thought off the top of my head 21 about whether it would -- which way -- which way it 21 on the timing, of course. 22 22 Q. Do you have any evidentiary basis in your 23 23 Q. Okay. So these are the only ones that report that the distinction between a nascent and a

44 (Pages 170 to 173)

mature league actually matters for these purposes at

24

25

24

25

you've analyzed in your report and that you are

using -- that you're opining about in this

190 192 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 Q. Virtually never? What do you mean by "thicker labor 3 3 A. Virtually never. markets"? Q. Okay. So when you say "monotonicity and 4 4 A. I have a chapter in one of my books that 5 5 goes into this in great detail which I highly even linearity of sharing rules are common in 6 organizations," what you're saying is that 6 recommend. 7 7 there's -- it's quite common for there to be a Q. I look forward to reading it. 8 8 positive share that the worker gets as output goes A. A thicker labor market -- or a thicker 9 up and even for that share to be linear. So even 9 market, forget about labor market, is just one where 10 10 for that share to be a fixed share of the marginal there's more buyers and sellers. 11 11 output? Q. Okay. Where there's -- okay. Good. So 12 12 A. It's -- correct. Monotonicity is -- you then what is a thicker labor market? 13 13 could say something much stronger than common. A. A thicker labor market is -- let's take the 14 Monotonicity is virtually always true. 14 simplest example -- let's take a simple example, an 15 15 Q. Okay. on-line job board. Okay. So if you go to 16 16 A. And linearity is common. careerbuilder.com there's literally thousands of 17 17 firms listing jobs and literally probably millions Q. Okay. And the linearity, though, is 18 18 realistically going to be positive, there's some of people looking for jobs. It's a very thick labor 19 19 market. There's a lot of opportunities to match and positive share? 20 20 A. Well, flat would be a very common thing meet each other. 21 21 Q. Okay. too. 22 22 O. Okav. A. If I take another labor market, which is 23 23 A. There's no -- you just have a salary. the classified ads of the Palo Alto Weekly, probably 24 24 Q. So flat could be common, but it's also doesn't even exist -- that probably does not even 25 common to see positive linearity? 25 exist anymore, but there was a time where that was a 191 193 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 A. Correct. thin labor market. It listed a few jobs, a few 3 Q. Okay. Okay. 3 people read it, maybe they would find each other, 4 Let's turn to page 1813 of the same 4 and, you know, it was probably not a very efficient 5 5 way to go about looking. So there was not a lot of exhibit. Do you see the header on page 18 -- 1813, 6 "3.2.9, Hiring, Agglomeration, and Firm Location"? 6 transactions. 7 7 A. I do. You know, you can take it outside of the --8 Q. Okay. And then starting with the second 8 again, sorry, but to take it to another example, you 9 sentence -- the first paragraph, the second sentence 9 can have a stock that sells in a very thin market 10 10 where there's only a few buyers and sellers and a says "Larger and more concentrated populations 11 typically lead to thicker labor markets which may 11 few shares transact every day, and then there's 12 reduce search costs and can also lead to better 12 something like --13 13 average matches between firms and workers. While Q. So you have to slow down a little bit, if 14 this will tend to increase surplus, thicker labor 14 you could. 15 15 markets also lead to greater competition in the A. -- and then you have something like Google 16 labor market. So while total surplus may be greater 16 which, you know, there's literally thousands of 17 17 in thicker labor markets, firms may have to settle people buy it every day and literally thousands of 18 18 for a smaller share of that surplus because it is others sell it every day. 19 more difficult to generate monopsony power." Do you 19 Q. Okay. So a thicker labor market is one 20 see that? 20 with more participants and a thinner one is one with 21 21 A. I do. fewer participants; is that fair to say? 22 22 Q. Okay. So I'm going to ask you a bunch of A. Yes. 23 23 questions that are largely designed to just Q. And a thicker labor market could be one 24 understand what you're saying there and what those 24 with more employers, it can be one with more 25 25 words mean. Okay. employees or workers, not necessarily employees, or

49 (Pages 190 to 193)

194 196 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 both; is that fair to say? much more -- that leads to each side having better 3 3 A. I would say that -- I'd have to think this options and more competition to hire or to be hired 4 through, but a thicker labor market is going to 4 than if there were two workers and two firms. 5 be -- you're really -- thickness involves more of 5 Q. Okay. 6 6 So you say -- you say in this paragraph, if 7 7 O. Okav. Usually more of both. Okav. Both I'm interpreting it correctly, that in a thicker 8 8 employers and workers? labor market it is more difficult for presumably 9 A. That's right. 9 employers to generate monopsony power; is that -- is 10 10 Q. Okay. Why do thicker labor markets lead to that correct? 11 greater competition in the labor markets? 11 A. Right. I mean, it's almost by definition. 12 12 A. Well, thicker markets lead to greater O. Okav. And just -- I'm sorry, but just --13 competition, period. That's a fundamental point in 13 just walk me through that. I think you've just 14 economics. 14 described it, but just walk me through that. 15 15 Q. Okay. A. Well, a monopsonistic labor market is one 16 16 A. So -where there's one firm in the extreme. 17 Q. But just to stick to the labor market in 17 Q. In the -- okay. 18 18 particular, why do thicker labor markets lead to A. I would still call it monopsonistic if you 19 19 had a few firms acting as a cartel or, you know, greater competition? 20 20 A. Right. So if it's costly -- so there's a something like that, but that by definition is a 21 class of models in labor economics called search 21 thinner market because the employees have fewer 22 22 models -- and people have won the Nobel Prize for options. 23 23 this -- and it's a very important point, and it just Q. And so then what happens is because -- am I 24 24 says that if I want to go hire a worker I have to right that what happens is because the workers can't 25 go -- there's some costs to that. 25 go to different prospective employers and play them 195 197 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 2 O. Okav. off against each other, the employer with 3 A. I have to search for them, I have to find 3 monopsonistic power is able to pay lower wages than 4 them, I have to interview them, I have to run a 4 it would in a competitive market; is that fair? 5 5 background check on them, all sorts of things like A. That's right. That's exactly right. 6 6 that. The background -- some of those things I just Q. Okay. 7 7 said aren't that relevant to thicker markets, but Now, you also indicate that total surplus 8 one of them is I have to go find them. So in a 8 may be greater in thicker markets. Why is that? 9 thick labor market if I can find ten candidates 9 A. Okay. So this is -- so this is where the 10 10 immediately and quickly determine who are the better stock market is different from the labor market. 11 ones, that -- that's better -- that's better for me 11 The labor market is a market of differentiated 12 as a firm. 12 goods. So workers are not perfect substitutes for 13 13 each other for reasons we discussed this morning. Q. Okay. 14 A. It's also better for the worker because 14 It's closer to true in the case of a lower -- some 15 15 low skill labor markets, but even there no two they don't have to interview as often, they don't 16 have to -- they don't have to spend time sending out 16 people are exactly the same. 17 17 Q. Okay. 18 18 Q. Okay. Maybe it's implicit in what you A. So if you have two -- now we're going to go 19 19 back to a very simple world. We have two firms, two said, but I just want to be clear. 20 A. Sure. 20 workers, and those two workers are differentiated in 21 Q. How does that lead to greater competition? 21 a way where one is more productive on average than 22 22 A. Oh. So just by -- if each worker is the other and it's likely that they have what we 23 23 would call a comparative -- each has what we would talking to ten firms simultaneously and finding the 24 best match and each firm is talking to ten workers 24 call a comparative advantage. 25 25 simultaneously and finding the best match, that's a Q. Okay.

50 (Pages 194 to 197)

198 200 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 A. So there might be one who is just more -your outside option is eight. 3 3 who went to college and is just more productive, Q. Okay. 4 they can read better or something like that, and 4 A. So you go work for that firm. You create 5 that person has what we call an absolute advantage. 5 two of surplus for that firm and they keep two and 6 But they might -- but then if you look at the two 6 you keep eight. Now let's throw in a third firm and 7 7 different firms, if they're producing different a third worker. So that third worker if -- so I'm 8 8 things, it might be the case that these two going to mess this example -- I always mess these 9 different employees have -- two different workers 9 examples up when I do them on the fly. But if we 10 10 have what we would call a comparative advantage. add a third worker, it's quite likely -- a third 11 So you might be a better fit for both --11 firm and a third worker and let's say -- let's say 12 you might be more productive at either firm than 12 at this third firm you would produce nine. So now 13 13 Eric, right? Is that -- you might be more you have ten, nine, and eight. Eric is seven, six, 14 productive than Eric at either firm, but you might 14 and five or something like that. So now that first 15 15 be especially more productive at firm A. And at firm has to pay you ten -- I'm sorry -- nine to get 16 16 firm B you would be more productive than him, but you to go work there. And so the surplus is the 17 it's better -- the overall amount we're going to 17 same because we still created ten, but you now have 18 18 produce is higher if you go to firm A and he goes to one more unit of it than you had before in the 19 firm B. 19 thinner labor market. 20 20 Q. I see. So in general in a labor market Q. Okay. So in the thicker labor market with 21 having more employers and more workers, a thicker |21|more employers and more workers, all else equal, 22 22 market is likely to result in, as you say, a greater what we expect is greater surplus and greater 23 23 surplus -- total surplus? productivity, but any given firm is likely to get a 24 24 A. That's right. smaller share of that surplus because the 25 Q. Okay. And presumably does that mean 25 competition, among other things, can force the firm 199 201 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 greater productivity? to pay higher wages to the worker? 3 A. Yeah, I would say that's right. 3 A. yeah. And -- exactly. And so the reason 4 Q. And then presumably that would also lead in 4 we have greater surplus in the example I just gave 5 5 you is that second firm, that's a nothing -- the turn to greater compensation, all else equal? 6 6 example I gave you that we worked out told you A. Yeah, I think that's right. 7 7 Q. You also say that while there's that nothing about total surplus. We need Eric to come 8 greater total surplus -- I'm paraphrasing -- that 8 back in for there to be total surplus because that 9 9 any given firm may have to settle for a smaller second firm now hires him where he produces -- I'm 10 10 going to mess the numbers up, but he produces a share of that surplus and that ties into the 11 11 monopsony power I think, but can you just explain little more than he did before and his wage also 12 why the firms would have to settle for a smaller 12 goes up. 13 13 Q. Nice. share of that surplus? 14 14 A. So -- well, so let's think about that. Let A. Well, we don't know because we don't have a 15 15 third -- we need a third person to set his me give you a very simple example. If you go to 16 work at firm A, you produce ten. If you go to work 16 outside -- a third firm to set his outside... 17 17 at firm B, you produce eight. Q. But without -- fair enough. It's very 18 18 Q. Okay. challenging to do these hypotheticals on the fly, 19 A. If Eric goes to work at firm A, he produces 19 but I think we're -- I think we've got clarity that 20 20 seven. If Eric goes to work at firm B, he produces the -- about the general dynamic, right, of a 21 21 six. thicker market causing there to be more -- well, 22 22 Q. Okay. means that there are more employers and more workers 23 23 A. Okay. So they have to pay you seven -- I'm and will tend to create overall surplus and overall 24 sorry. Firm B is willing to pay you up to eight, so 24 productivity and higher wages or higher 25 25 firm A hires you and pays you eight, okay, because compensation, but lower amounts of surplus may go to

51 (Pages 198 to 201)

	202		204
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	any one employer; is that fair?	2	A. Yes.
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. Yeah. Which side were you on? Were you
4	Q. Okay. Okay. Let me switch switch	4	retained by the coaches or by the NCAA?
5	topics.	5	A. The NCAA.
6	Are you a sports economist?	6	MR. DAVIS: Why don't we take a short
7	A. I don't know how one would define that.	7	break.
8	Q. Do you think of sports economics as a	8	THE WITNESS: Okay.
9	distinctive area of economics?	9	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record at
10	A. Not really. I mean, sort of, but not	10	2:35.
11	Q. But you haven't ever analyzed written a	11	(A short break was had.)
12	paper analyzing compensation to workers in the	12	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the
13	sports context; is that fair to say?	13	record at 2:47. This begins disk No. 5.
14	A. I don't believe I've written a paper	14	BY MR. DAVIS:
15	analyzing sports.	15	Q. Have you ever testified at deposition or
16	Q. Have you taught sports economics?	16	trial for a Plaintiff in an antitrust case?
17	A. You mean like a whole class in sports	17	A. At deposition or at trial, no.
18	economics?	18	Q. Have you ever testified in any other
19	Q. Yes.	19	context for a Plaintiff in an antitrust case?
20	A. No.	20	A. So what do you mean? What do you mean by
21	Q. Okay. Have you worked as a consultant or	21	"testified"? What "testified" meaning in a
22	other expert for a sports league?	22	situation such as this?
23	A. I've worked I've worked for sports	23	Q. Have you ever supported in any way as an
24	I've worked as a consultant for sports	24	expert a Plaintiff in an antitrust case?
25	organizations.	25	A. Yes.
	203		205
1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	PAUL OYER - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. In that work did you do any analysis of the	2	Q. In what context was that?
3	compensation of athletes?	3	A. So I was the I was going to work I
4	A. Athletes, no.	4	briefly worked as Plaintiff's expert in the
5	Q. Which sports organization did you work for?	5	High-Tech worker litigation yeah, the High-Tech
6	A. These are consulting arrangements I had.	6	workers' litigation case, the antitrust case.
7	What are the rules on sort of I have to be	7	Q. In the Northern District of California?
8	fair to you know, these were prior litigation	8	A. That's right.
9	cases. I don't know to what I can give you	9	Q. Did you offer any written opinion in that
10	Q. Right.	10	case?
11	A. I don't know exactly what's public and	11	A. No.
12	what's not on these.	12	Q. Did you ever testify and you didn't
13	Q. Were you ever disclosed as an expert in a	13	testify at deposition or at trial?
14	litigation?	14	A. No.
15	A. I'm trying to think if I I mean, I just	15	Q. With whom did you work?
16	don't know the answer to that. Yeah, in one I was	16	A. Joseph (indecipherable).
17	disclosed as an expert to the other side for sure.	17	THE REPORTER: I'm sorry?
18	I don't know what happened. The case then ended and	18	BY THE WITNESS:
19	I was told to destroy all documents. What happens	19	A. Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein.
20	in that case?	20	Q. Interesting.
21	Q. What case what case was that at least?	21	And so you only consulted in that matter;
22	A. It was a case between the NCAA and some	22	is that fair to say?
23	former coaches at Penn State University.	23	A. I was I left the case before it got very
24	Q. And was it was it about coach	24	far.
25	compensation; was that the issue generally?	25	Q. Okay. Is that the only time that you

52 (Pages 202 to 205)